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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AT&T'S 
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University of Tennessee 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, we estimate the degree of market power held by AT&T in the 
interstate long-distance market in the postdivestiture p riod. Our approach makes 
use of the dominant firm/competitive fringe model to impose the structure needed 
both to obtain estimates of the relevant structural parameters and to translate these 
parameters into an estimate of AT&T's residual demand elasticity and associated 
Lerner index. Because of the continued presence of regulation and other consider- 
ations, however, a direct estimation of the residual demand elasticity is not feasible. 
Consequently, we take a more indirect approach that combines estimation of the 
elasticity of fringe firm supply, market demand estimation, and extant market share 
data to generate estimates of the desired elasticity. The resulting estimates strongly 
support the conclusion that AT&T lacks significant market power in the postdivesti- 
ture long-distance market. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ONE of the most important policy issues in the telecommunications in- 
dustry over the past decade and today has been the degree of market power 
held by AT&T. This issue has been the subject of extensive debate in regu- 
latory hearing rooms throughout the country, before state and federal legis- 
lative bodies, and in the economics literature. Divergent opinions concern- 
ing this question have influenced regulatory decisions and legislative 
proposals ranging from relaxed regulation of this firm to removal of the re- 
striction on entry by the Bell operating companies (BOCs) into the in- 
* The authors would like to thank John Jackson, Michael Ward, Sam Peltzman, an un- 
named editor, and the anonymous referees for valuable insights and comments on earlier ver- 
sions of this article. We retain sole responsibility for any remaining errors. 
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terLATA market.' Indeed, it is difficult to imagine another applied micro- 
economics question that is likely to have as profound an effect on our 
public policy toward this industry in the coming years. 
To date, however, virtually all evaluations of AT&T's market power 
have been based on a more-or-less traditional antitrust analysis of the mar- 
ket structure within which this firm operates.2 That is, these evaluations 
have relied on evidence pertaining to structural characteristics uch as mar- 
ket share and barriers to entry to reach judgmentally based conclusions 
about the degree of control over price that AT&T is likely to possess in a 
deregulated environment. Substantial differences of opinion have emerged 
from these analyses.3 To a large extent, these differences may be traced to 
different implicit weights that the individual economists and regulatory 
agencies have attached to these various structural attributes (for example, 
market share versus entry conditions) and divergent expectations with re- 
spect to the likelihood of concerted action on the part of firms in this in- 
dustry. 
New developments in the economics literature over the past decade have 
' This restriction is contained in the 1982 divestiture order. See Modification of Final 
Judgment, United States of America v. Western Electric Company and American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, Civil Action No. 82-0192, with Revisions as of January 1, 1989. 
Most recently, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines conditions under which the Bell 
operating companies will be permitted to provide interLATA services. LATA is an acronym 
for local access and transport area. 
2 For an exception, see Michael R. Ward, Measurements of Market Power in Long Dis- 
tance Telecommunications (staff report, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 
Washington, D.C., 1995). 
3 Several of these studies have appeared over the past few years reaching diametrically 
opposing conclusions regarding the intensity of competition in this market. Studies that argue 
that significant market power is present include Jerry A. Hausman, The Long Distance Indus- 
try Today (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Inst. Tech. 1993); Steven C. Salop, Steven R. 
Brenner & Gary L. Roberts, Market Power in the Supply of Long-Distance Services (unpub- 
lished manuscript, Charles River Associates 1990); Paul A. MacAvoy, Tacit Collusion under 
Regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services, 4 J. Econ. & 
Mgmt. Strategy 147, 185 (1995); and William G. Shepherd, Long-Distance Telephone Ser- 
vice: Dominance in Decline? in Industry Studies (Larry L. Duetsch ed. 1993). 
Studies that posit the presence of effective competition include Michael L. Katz & Robert 
D. Willig, The Case for Freeing AT&T, Regulation, 43, 49 (1983); David L. Kaserman & 
John W. Mayo, Long Distance Telecommunications Policy: Rationality on Hold, 122 Pub. 
Util. Fort. 18, 27 (1988); Michael E. Porter, Competition in the Long Distance Telecommuni- 
cations Market (unpublished report, Monitor Company 1993); Robert E. Hall, Long Distance: 
Public Benefits from Increased Competition (unpublished manuscript, Applied Economic 
Partners, Menlo Park, Calif. 1993); David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long-Distance 
Telecommunications: Expectations and Realizations in the Post-divestiture Period, in Incen- 
tive Regulation for Public Utilities (Michael A. Crew ed. 1994); and David L. Kaserman & 
John W. Mayo, Competition and Asymmetric Regulation in Long-Distance Telecommunica- 
tions: An Assessment of the Evidence, 4 Comm L. Conspectus 1, 26 (Winter 1996). These 
studies serve to highlight the importance of this debate and the glaring need for empirical 
work in this area. 
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produced an alternative, econometrically based, approach to the evaluation 
of market power.4 Several alternative econometric techniques have been in- 
troduced to estimate the extent to which individual firms' output decisions 
influence market price. Implementing one or more of these techniques can, 
under certain conditions, yield an estimate of the price elasticity of the indi- 
vidual firm's residual demand curve. The inverse of this elasticity, then, 
provides a direct estimate of the Lerner index of the degree of monopoly 
power held by that firm. 
In this article, we estimate the residual demand elasticity and associated 
Lerner index for AT&T in the interstate long-distance market in the postdi- 
vestiture period. Because of the continued presence of regulation and other 
considerations, however, direct estimation of this elasticity along traditional 
lines is not feasible. Consequently, we take a more indirect approach that 
utilizes estimates of the underlying components of the desired elasticity. 
This approach makes use of the dominant firm/competitive fringe (DF/CF) 
model to impose the structure needed both to obtain estimates of the rele- 
vant structural parameters and to translate these parameters into an estimate 
of AT&T's residual demand elasticity and Lerner index. 
The resulting estimates strongly support the conclusion that AT&T lacks 
significant market power in the postdivestiture long-distance market. While 
such evidence is not likely to completely resolve the ongoing debate about 
the appropriate regulatory policy for this industry, it should contribute to 
the overall quality of that debate by adding an alternative empirical ap- 
proach that is well founded in modem econometric methods of estimating 
market power. 
The article is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe various 
conceptual considerations related to formulation of the empirical model. In 
Section III, we provide a description of the data and present our estimation 
results. The residual demand elasticity estimates and market power calcula- 
tions are then reported and interpreted in Section IV. Finally, in Section 
V, we provide conclusions and discuss several caveats that accompany our 
analysis. 
II. CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Under certain conditions, natural market events may generate data that 
allow researchers to draw inferences about the percentage departure of price 
from marginal cost, even though the relevant marginal opportunity costs are 
4 See, for example, the papers included in the issue-length conference on "Empirical Ap- 
proaches to Market Power," 32 J. Law & Econ. (October 1989). Also, see Timothy F. Bres- 
nahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Orga- 
nization (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds. 1989). 
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generally unobservable. When such events occur, fairly generalized models 
of industry demand functions and individual firms' supply relations can 
yield estimates of structural parameters that shed light on the type of behav- 
ior exhibited by market participants, that is, whether the firms are colluding 
or competing.5 
Within this class of models, an important approach has been estimation 
of firms' residual demand elasticities.6 Because of the functional relation- 
ship that exists between the individual firm's price elasticity of residual de- 
mand and the Lerner index of market power, estimation of a company's 
residual demand curve provides a direct method of calculating the degree 
of market power it enjoys.' Therefore, to evaluate the extent of AT&T's 
market power in the postdivestiture long-distance market, we estimate the 
price elasticity of this firm's residual demand.8 To provide the structure nec- 
essary to evaluate the degree of AT&T's market power in the interstate 
long-distance market, we make use of the DF/CF model. The principal as- 
sumptions of this model are (1) there is one firm that holds a relatively large 
share of the market (that is, the dominant firm); (2) there is a competitive 
fringe, consisting of a large number of much smaller firms, each of which 
takes the dominant firm's price as given; and (3) the product is homoge- 
neous. 
These assumptions appear to be reasonably well satisfied in the long- 
distance market during the time period covered by our data, 1984-93. First, 
during this period, AT&T continued to hold a relatively large share of the 
long-distance market. In particular, while there was a noticeable decline in 
AT&T's minutes-of-use market share, from 84 to 59 percent, the average 
share was 72 percent over this period.9 As a point of reference, some eco- 
5 See Bresnahan, supra note 4, for a survey. 
6 See Jonathon B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and 
Measuring Market Power, 61 Antitrust L. J. 3, 16 (1991). For an application of residual de- 
mand estimation, see Jonathon B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual 
Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 283, 300 (1988). 
7 Residual demand estimation has also been applied to the issue of market definition. See David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition under the U.S. De- 
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J. Law & Econ. 123, 147 (1987). 
8 Direct estimation of residual demand in this market environment, however, is precluded. 
As explained by Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 6, at 7, estimation of residual demand func- 
tions requires identification of exogenous variables that shift one firm's marginal costs with- 
out affecting the costs of other firms in the industry. Firms competing in the long-distance 
market, however, all purchase essentially the same set of inputs at roughly equivalent prices. 
Consequently, AT&T has not experienced the sort of independent cost shifts that would 
allow identification of its residual demand curve from the available data. Additional structure 
must, therefore, be imposed on the model to permit this estimation. 
9 See Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Statistics of Communications Com- 
mon Carriers, 1993/1994 ed. (released February 1995). 
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nomics literature suggests a threshold market share value of 40 percent in 
their treatment of the dominant firm model.'" Also, consistent with the mod- 
el's assumptions, during this period AT&T faced a considerably fragmented 
set of individually relatively small competitors. In 1986, AT&T faced 
roughly 170 competitors." By 1993, that number had grown to 440.12 At 
the beginning of the sample period, no single competitor to AT&T provided 
more than 6 percent of the interstate long-distance traffic. 
As the industry structure has evolved over time, AT&T's two largest 
competitors, MCI and Sprint, have grown considerably. At the beginning 
of the sample period, the revenue-based market shares of these two firms 
were 5.5 and 2.6 percent, respectively. In 1988, these market shares were 
10.3 and 7.2 percent, and by 1993 they had grown to 17.8 and 10.0.13 The 
dominant firm model assumes that the fringe competitors are individually 
small enough that they accept the price of the dominant firm as given in 
determining their supply response. The classification of MCI and Sprint as 
fringe firms is admittedly a matter of judgment. We believe, however, it is 
justified by the relatively new positions of these firms in the market and 
their relatively small market shares during the period in question. As these 
firms continue to grow, it becomes increasingly less clear by the mid-1990s 
that the long-distance industry still conforms well to the assumptions of the 
DF/CF model.14 
Another important benchmark for the application of the DF/CF model is 
the degree of product homogeneity. In a pure DF/CF model, all of the 
firms' products are perfectly homogeneous. Clearly, this is a simplifying 
abstraction that is rarely, if ever, met in empirical modeling. At the same 
time, application of the theoretical model should be applied to industries 
that at least approximately conform to the assumption. The relatively com- 
parable levels of transmission speeds and quality, functions and features of 
10 See F. M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perfor- 
mance (3d ed. 1990). 
" FCC, supra note 9. 
12 Id. Also, firm structure varies considerably across these competitors. Some carriers (for 
example, MCI and Sprint) are vertically integrated with both underlying transmission facili- 
ties and retail service offerings. Others participate xclusively at the wholesale stage (the so- 
called carriers' carriers,) or retail stage (that is, resellers). 
13 See Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Common Carrier Bureau, Industry 
Analysis Division, Trends in Telephone Service, February 1995. 
14 The observed evolution of the industry structure in the long-distance market is consis- 
tent with a literature beginning with Dean A. Worcester, Why "Dominant" Firms Decline, 
65 J. Pol. Econ. 338, 346 (1957), wherein it is argued that the dominant firm case is inher- 
ently unstable and that such industries will, over time, evolve to alternative market structures. 
Thus, the "window of opportunity" to analyze the long-distance, or any, industry in light of 
the DF/CF model may be innately limited. 
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long-distance calling in the postdivestiture period, together with an ob- 
served willingness of consumers to switch long-distance carriers, provides 
a relatively compelling prima facie case that consumers view long-distance 
services as essentially homogeneous.15 
Additionally, however, the pure DF/CF model that assumes perfect prod- 
uct homogeneity may be modified to account for any tangible sources of 
product differentiation that may be part of the industry in question.'6 In the 
case of the long-distance market over the 1984-93 period, the primary 
source of product differentiation was the lack of dialing parity between 
AT&T and its competitors. Specifically, in the absence of switching up- 
grades by the local exchange companies, known as "equal access," AT&T 
uniquely enjoyed "1 +" dialing at the time of the divestiture. In the absence 
of equal access, customers of all other long-distance companies were forced 
to dial additional digits to access their long-distance carrier before dialing 
the number of the party with whom they wished to speak. Beginning in 
1984, and continuing throughout the sample period, however, local exchange 
companies have increasingly deployed equal access in their central office 
switches. By the end of the sample period, 97 percent of all telephone lines 
nationwide were converted to equal access.17 Coincident with the proliferation 
of equal access and the increasing recognition of product homogeneity in 
the supply of long-distance services, the prices of these services have rapidly 
'" The comparability of the technical quality of long-distance service provided by interex- 
change firms is well established. See, for example, Mary Jander, Users Rate Long-Distance, 
22 Data Comm. 89, 92 (1993). Evidence of consumers' willingness to switch long-distance 
carriers is found in Robert E. Allen, Testimony before the United States Committee on Com- 
merce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, September 8, 
1993, wherein it is noted that in 1992, over 16 million customers switched their long-distance 
carriers. Advertising is a potential source of product differentiation. Several points, however, 
indicate that the advertising in the long-distance market is not a significant impediment to 
the applicability of the DF/CF model. First, virtually all industries engage in advertising. To 
the extent that advertising provides information regarding, say, pricing, its presence should 
not be a seen as indicative of significant product differentiation. Second, while advertising 
is common in the long-distance market, it was not, by U.S. advertising standards, "intense" 
during the sample period. For example, advertising to sales ratios for AT&T for the 1984- 
88 period were roughly 1 percent. No major carrier's advertising to sales ratio exceeded 5 
percent over this period. See Porter, supra note 3. Finally, the proliferation of customer 
switching indicates that, although there is considerable ffort by long-distance carriers to en- 
gender brand loyalty, advertising has not, in fact, created significant product differentiation. 
16 For examples of empirical DF/CF models that have successfully accounted for elements 
of intraindustry product differentiation, see Valerie Suslow, Estimating Monopoly Behavior 
with Competitive Recycling: An Application to ALCOA, 17 RAND J. Econ. 389, 403 
(1986); and Larry R. Blank, David L. Kaserman, & John W. Mayo, Dominant Firm Pricing 
with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll (unpublished manu- 
script, Univ. Tennessee 1995). 
'~ FCC, supra note 13, table 12, p. 20. 
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converged over time.'" In sum, for the 1984-93 period, the fundamental 
characteristics of the long-distance market conform reasonably well with the 
assumptions underlying the DF/CF model. The empirical model specified 
below, however, accounts for any potential product differentiation in the 
long-distance market caused by the lack of ubiquitous equal access. 
Given the DF/CF model, the residual demand curve faced by AT&T is 
given by the total market demand curve minus the collective supply curve 
of the competitive fringe; that is, 
QAT(P) = QM(P) - QF(P), (1) 
where P is the price of long-distance service, QATT(P) is AT&T's residual 
demand, QM(P) is market demand, and QF(P) is fringe supply. Due to the 
price-taking behavior exhibited by fringe producers, QF(P) is given by the 
collective marginal cost curve of these firms. Equation (1) may be manipu- 
lated to obtain the dominant firm's residual demand elasticity as a function 
of three underlying structural parameters: 
V- M (1 - SATT)EF EATT = + (2) SATT SATT 
where VjATT is AT&T's residual demand elasticity, TlM is the market demand 
elasticity, SATT is AT&T's market share, and EF is the price elasticity of 
fringe supply.19 
Equation (2) may be used to calculate 'nATT from prior estimates of three 
underlying structural parameters-rIM, EF, and SATT. Estimates of SATT and 
r1M are readily available in the published literature. No such estimates of EF, 
however, exist. In fact, one could argue that the absence of such an estimate 
is the principal source of the ongoing debate regarding the intensity of com- 
petition (and, therefore, optimal regulatory policy) in this market. There- 
fore, in order to implement equation (2), we must first estimate the price 
elasticity of fringe supply. 
Toward this end, we specify a simultaneous model of competitive fringe 
supply and market demand in the interstate long-distance market. The the- 
18 See Kaserman & Mayo, Long-Distance Telecommunications, upra note 3, for evidence 
of convergence of prices for intrastate toll services. A similar convergence has occurred for 
interstate services. Indeed, a review of the rates charged for basic residential message toll 
service between various locations in 1993 reveals that the these prices for AT&T, MCI, and 
Sprint are virtually identical. See FCC, supra note 9, tables 7.1-7.3. 
'~ See Thomas R. Saving, Concentration Ratios and the Degree of Monopoly, 11 Int'l 
Econ. Rev. 139, 146 (1970). 
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ory of supply suggests the following general specification for the inverse 
supply curve of the fringe: 
P = PF (QF, PA, EA). (3) 
Here, QF is the fringe output, PA is the price long-distance firms pay to the 
local exchange companies on a minutes-of-use basis for access to the local 
network, and EA is the percentage of telephone lines converted to equal 
access. Carrier access is the predominant input required for the production 
of long-distance service, generally accounting for over half of these firms' 
total costs (and even more of their marginal costs). Thus, 3PFf/PA > 0 is 
expected to hold. 
As noted above, the primary source of product differentiation in the post- 
divestiture long-distance industry has been the lack of dialing parity be- 
tween AT&T and its rivals. To explicitly account for this element of prod- 
uct differentiation, we include a measure of the proliferation of equal access 
(EA) in the long-distance industry over time. We expect that, as the degree 
of product homogeneity increases with growth in the extent of equal access, 
the ability of fringe suppliers to expand their output is increased, ceteris 
paribus, and price pressure on the dominant firm will grow. Accordingly, 
we expect that 3PFf/EA < 0. That is, equal access shifts fringe supply out- 
ward. 
Finally, because fringe supply is expected either to slope upward or to 
be horizontal, )PFlaQF > 0 should hold. It is this last parameter, of course, 
that is the primary focus of our attention, because it reveals the ability and 
willingness of AT&T's competitors to enter and expand in response to any 
attempted price increases. That ability, in turn, is a primary determinant of 
AT&T's market power. The closer this parameter is to zero (that is, the 
more elastic is fringe supply), the lower are barriers to entry and expansion 
and, therefore, the greater the intensity of potential competition. Con- 
versely, a large positive coefficient on QF would indicate a relatively inelas- 
tic fringe supply with comparatively ineffective potential competition. 
Turning to the inverse market demand function for long-distance service, 
we specify 
P = PM (QM, PL, PHONE, PHONESQ, Y, Di), (4) 
where QM is the market quantity, PL is an index of real prices for local tele- 
phone service, PHONE is the number of U.S. households that subscribe to 
telephone service, PHONESQ is the square of PHONE, Y is real per capita 
income, and Di is a vector of three quarterly dummies. We expect market 
demand to slope downward. We expect increases in the price of local tele- 
phone service to reduce the demand for long-distance service due to the 
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complementary nature of these products.20 We expect increases in house- 
hold subscribership generally to increase market demand. We allow for a 
nonlinear (quadratic) relationship between subscribership and demand due 
to the network characteristic of telecommunications consumption-a dou- 
bling of subscribers is likely to more than double the market demand. Fi- 
nally, we expect increases in income to increase long-distance demand. 
Thus, our hypotheses regarding equation (4) are that PM/aQM < 0, PM/ 
aPL < 0, PM//PHONE > 0, and 3PM/l3Y > 0. No hypotheses are ex- 
pressed with respect to Di. Our primary interest will be in the parameter 
associated with QM due to its relationship to the market price elasticity of 
demand and the corresponding relationship of that elasticity to the Lerner 
index. 
Equations (3) and (4) constitute a simultaneous DF/CF model with P, 
QM, and QF endogenous. The exogenous variables included in this system 
are PA, EA, PL, PHONE, PHONESQ, Y, and Di.21 Estimation of these two 
structural relationships provides estimates of qrm and EF that, together with 
observed values of SATT, can be used to calculate rlATr via equation (2). This 
elasticity of residual demand, in turn, can be used to calculate the Lerner 
index for AT&T in the postdivestiture period. 
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Within the framework of the DF/CF model, the market price, the quan- 
tity supplied by fringe firms, and the market quantity are determined simul- 
taneously. Thus, estimation of the fringe supply and market demand func- 
tions with ordinary least squares would produce inconsistent and biased 
parameter estimates. Accordingly, we utilize two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
to estimate the model. The data used for this estimation are quarterly obser- 
vations covering the time period from 1984:3 through 1993:4. Thus, our 
sample contains 38 observations. Appendix Table Al provides our variable 
definitions and data sources. 
Estimation results for the fringe supply curve in linear form with 2SLS 
are reported in Table 1.22 The explanatory power of the model is quite high, 
20 Jerry Hausman, Timothy Tardiff, & Alexander Belinfante, The Effects of the Breakup 
of AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the United States, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 178, 184 (1993), 
report empirical evidence of such complementarity. 
21 An examination of the estimating equations indicates that the fringe supply is overiden- 
tified and the market demand equation is exactly identified. In this context, two-stage least 
squares is an appropriate estimation technique. See, for example, Jan Kmenta, Elements of 
Econometrics (2d ed. 1986). 
22 The model was also estimated with three-stage least squares (3SLS). Because the 3SLS 
results are virtually identical to the 2SLS results, we report only the latter here. Also, the 
model was estimated using both linear and double-log specifications. Because the basic re- 
sults are invariant o the specification, we report the estimations from the linear specification. 
508 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
TABLE 1 
INVERSE FRINGE SUPPLY EQUATION: Two-STAGE LEAST 
SQUARES ESTIMATES 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept .059 1.921** 
QF .002 3.346* 
PA 1.860 11.293* 
EA -.001 -6.173* 
R2 .99 
* Significant at the .01 level. 
** Significant at the .10 level. 
and all coefficients attain the expected signs. Moreover, all parameters are 
statistically significant. The positive sign on the coefficient of QF indicates 
an upward-sloping fringe supply. The positive sign on the coefficient of PA 
suggests that fringe supply shifts backward with increases in the price of 
the principal input (that is, access). The negative sign attached to the coef- 
ficient of EA confirms our expectation that the provision of equal access 
and the commensurate decreases in the degree of product differentiation in- 
crease fringe supply. 
Most important, the 2SLS results produce a fringe supply elasticity esti- 
mate of 4.38 at the sample means. Thus, our results suggest a large supply 
response to a price change on the part of fringe firms in this industry.23 This 
finding, in turn, is consistent with prior arguments that have posited an ab- 
sence of significant barriers to entry and expansion in this industry.24 
Next, Table 2 reports our estimation results for the interstate long- 
distance telecommunications market demand function using 2SLS. Here, 
too, the results appear to be quite reasonable. The model exhibits consider- 
able explanatory power, and all hypothesized coefficient signs are obtained. 
23 This finding that the elasticity of fringe firm supply in the long-distance industry is large 
is corroborated by an examination of marketplace data regarding barriers to entry and expan- 
sion of fringe firms in the postdivestiture period. Specifically, the phenomenal growth in the 
number of firms indicates that entry into the long-distance industry is not difficult. Moreover, 
these new entrants have sustained a decade-long compound annual growth rate (based on 
minutes sold) of roughly 20 percent, indicating that barriers to expansion are minimal. At 
the same time, the amount of capacity deployed in the long-distance market has expanded 
very rapidly. See Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Fiber Deployment Update- 
End of Year 1993 (unpublished report, FCC, May 1994); and AT&T Bell Laboratories, An 
Update Study of AT&T's Competitors' Capacity to Absorb Rapid Demand Growth (unpub- 
lished manuscript, AT&T, April 1995). As a consequence, fringe firms either own or have 
access to large amounts of capacity with which they can easily expand output. 
24 Katz & Willig, supra note 3; Porter, supra note 3; and Kaserman & Mayo (Long- 
Distance Telecommunications Policy; Long-Distance Telecommunications; Competition and 
Asymmetric Regulation, all supra note 3), among others, have made such arguments. 
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TABLE 2 
INVERSE MARKET DEMAND EQUATION: Two-STAGE 
LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept 9.313 5.747* QM -.006 -4.655* 
PL - .003 -5.063* 
PHONE -.206 -5.642* 
PHONESQ .001 6.630* 
Y 1.07 x 10-5 5.104* 
D2 .002 .625 
D3 .009 2.152** 
D4 .009 2.107* 
R2 .99 
F 737.043 
Durbin-Watson 1.808 
* Significant at the .01 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
Moreover, all coefficients except the second-quarter dummy are significant 
at the .05 level or higher. These results confirm a downward-sloping market 
demand that declines with higher local telephone rates. The coefficients 
attached to PHONE and PHONESQ suggest a U-shaped relationship be- 
tween subscribership and long-distance demand. At the sample mean, how- 
ever, aP/fPHONE = 0.0093 > 0, and )2P/)PHONE2 = 0.002 > 0. Thus, 
at these values, demand increases at an increasing rate as subscribership 
rises. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations for products 
subject to network externality effects. Finally, long-distance demand in- 
creases with per capita income (it is a normal good) and is significantly 
higher in the third and fourth quarters. 
For our purposes, the result that is of primary importance is the market 
price elasticity of demand. At the sample means, the results reported in Ta- 
ble 2 yield an elasticity estimate of -0.49. Given the time-series nature of 
our data, this estimate should correspond to a short-run demand elasticity. 
Accordingly, this figure conforms with, but is at the low end of the range 
of, elasticities for this market reported in a recent survey of telecommunica- 
tions demand studies.25 Consequently, use of this relatively low market 
price elasticity estimate will tend to bias our Lerner index calculations up- 
ward. 
25 Lester D. Taylor, Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice 17 (1994), states 
that, "[i]n general, these new studies show price elasticities of -0.5 to -0.75 for interLATA 
(i.e., longer-haul) toll calling." Also, see J. P. Gatto et al., Intrastate Switched Access De- 
mand, 3 Info. Econ. & Pol'y 333, 358 (1988). 
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IV. RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY AND MARKET 
POWER CALCULATIONS 
Given the above estimates of EF and VIM and knowledge of AT&T's mar- 
ket share, SArr, we can calculate estimates of AT&T's residual demand elas- 
ticity and corresponding estimates of the Lerner index for this firm. Market 
share figures are generally based upon either output or capacity.26 Federal 
Communications Commission figures indicate an output-based market share 
for AT&T at the end of 1993 of 60 percent, while AT&T's share of indus- 
try assets was equal to approximately 40 percent.27 
From these two alternative values of SATT, we can substitute the estimated 
values of EF and TiM into equation (2). These substitutions yield values of 
AT&T's residual demand elasticity of -3.73 and -7.81, for the output- 
based and capacity-based market shares, respectively. The corresponding 
values of the Lerner index (k), then, are .29 and .13. Given that the theoreti- 
cal range of the Lerner index is from zero to unity, the relatively low values 
of these estimates suggest that AT&T does not possess significant market 
power in the pricing of long-distance services.28 
These Lerner index figures, however, are somewhat difficult to interpret 
in isolation. To gain a better perspective on what these numbers imply, it 
is useful to compare them with similar estimates for other industries. Fortu- 
nately, two recent studies provide a basis for such comparison. First, a pa- 
per by Hall reports estimates of the ratio of marginal cost to price for 26 
U.S. industries.29 As seen in Table 3, Hall's estimates can easily be trans- 
formed into estimates of the Lerner index for these industries.30 
26 See, for example, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Hori- 
zontal Merger Guidelines, which, depending on the particular circumstances prevalent in a 
market, state that these agencies will use either total sales or capacity to calculate market 
shares. Capacity-based market share calculations have greater information content in the 
long-distance telecommunications market. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Analysis of 
Market Power, with Some Thoughts about Regulated Industries, in Telecommunications De- 
regulation: Market Power and Cost Allocation Issues 7, 8 (John R. Allison & Dennis L. 
Thomas eds. 1987). 
27 Output-based market shares are reported in FCC, supra note 9. An estimate of AT&T's 
asset-based market share is found in John Haring & Kathleen Levitz, What Makes the Domi- 
nant Firm Dominant? (working paper, Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans 
and Policies 1989). Corroboration for the asset-based market share statistic is found in FCC, 
supra note 23; and AT&T Bell Laboratories, supra note 23. 
28 Interestingly, Ward, supra note 2, uses an alternative conometric model and different 
data to quantify the magnitude of AT&T's own-price elasticity and its associated Lerner in- 
dex with results very similar to those reported here. 
29 See Robert E. Hall, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 
J. Pol. Econ. 921, 947 (1988). 
30 The study by Hall, id., is built on a number of simplifying assumptions and utilizes 
Census Bureau Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) definitions of industries. Thus, his 
estimates regarding the degree of market power in any particular industry should be inter- 
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TABLE 3 
HALL'S MARKET POWER ESTIMATES FOR OTHER (UNREGULATED) INDUSTRIES 
Industry (MC/P) (P - MC)/P = 1 - I P/(P - MC) = 
1/, Food and kindred products .189 .811 1.23 
Tobacco manufactures .362 .638 1.57 
Textile mill products .388 .612 1.63 
Apparel and other textile 1.213 -.123 -4.69 
Lumber and wood products .555 .445 2.25 
Furniture and fixtures .506 .494 2.02 
Paper and allied products .269 .731 1.37 
Printing and publishing .07 .93 1.08 
Chemicals and allied products .05 .95 1.05 
Petroleum and coal products -.007 1.007 .99 
Rubber and miscellaneous .663 .337 2.97 
Leather and leather products .476 .524 1.91 
Stone, clay, and glass products .394 .606 1.65 
Primary metal industries .46 .54 1.85 
Fabricated metal products .607 .393 2.54 
Machinery, except electrical .7 .3 3.33 
Electrical and electronic .324 .676 1.48 
Instruments and related .716 .284 3.52 
Miscellaneous manufacturing .223 .777 1.29 
Communication .028 .972 1.02 
Electric, gas, and sanitary .079 .921 1.09 
Motor vehicles and equipment .567 .433 2.31 
Other transportation equipment 1.053 -.053 - 18.87 
Transportation .251 .749 1.34 
Wholesale trade -.271 1.271 .79 
Retail trade .425 .575 1.74 
SOURCEs.-Robert E. Hall, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. Pol. 
Econ. 921, 947 (1988); and authors' calculations. 
Comparing Hall's estimates to our estimates for AT&T, we find that, rel- 
ative to these other industries, AT&T possesses remarkably little market 
power. The mean value of our Lerner index estimates is .20 for AT&T, 
while the mean of the 22 industries for which Hall's estimates fall within 
the theoretically acceptable range (that is, for which 0 - , < 1) is .62. 
Moreover, the maximum estimate of , we obtain for AT&T is .29. This 
value is below every single industry in Hall's sample that generated a Ler- 
ner index value within the acceptable range, with the single exception of 
preted cautiously. For example, local telephone exchange, long-distance, and cable television 
operations are combined to yield an aggregated estimate for "Communications." An addi- 
tional caveat to the use of Hall's estimates stems from the fact that they are built on a data 
series that ends in 1984. Despite these caveats, Hall's Lerner index values nonetheless pro- 
vide a useful benchmark for comparison purposes. 
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TABLE 4 
BRESNAHAN'S SURVEY OF PRIOR EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF LERNER INDICES 
Author Industry k 
Lopez (1984) Food processing .504 
Roberts (1984) Coffee roasting .055/.025* 
Appelbaum (1982) Rubber .049 
Appelbaum (1982) Textile .072t 
Appelbaum (1982) Electrical machinery .198t 
Appelbaum (1982) Tobacco .648t 
Porter (1983) Railroads .40t 
Slade (1987) Retail gasoline .10 
Bresnahan (1981) Automobiles (1970s) .1/.34? 
Suslow (1986) Aluminum (interwar) .59 
Spiller-Favaro (1984) Banks "before"1l .88/.21# 
Spiller-Favaro (1984) Banks "after"11 .40/. 16# 
SouRcE.-For full author citations, see Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Indus- 
tries with Market Power, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization (Richard Schmalensee & 
Robert Willig eds. 1989). 
* Largest and second largest firm, respectively. 
t At sample midpoint. 
t When cartel was succeeding; 0 in reversionary periods. 
? Varies by type of car; larger in standard, luxury segment. 
II Uruguayan banks before and after entry deregulation. 
Large firms/small firms (see their table 2). 
Instruments and Related Products.31 Thus, relative to these other industries 
(virtually all of which are unregulated), AT&T appears to face very effec- 
tive competition. 
Finally, Bresnahan's survey of prior empirical studies of market power 
in individual industries presents a table summarizing the Lerner indices es- 
timated by various authors.32 We reproduce the results of that survey in Ta- 
ble 4. Almost a dozen industries are represented. The range of estimated 
market power is quite broad, with the Lerner index ranging from a low of 
.025 to a high of .88. Nonetheless, our estimates of AT&T's Lerner index 
clearly fall toward the low end of the reported indices. The mean Lerner 
index reported in Bresnahan is .296, which is slightly above even our maxi- 
mum estimate for AT&T. Thus, this second comparison also supports the 
3~ Stefan Norrbin, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry: A Con- 
tradiction, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 1149, 1164 (1993), modifies Hall's analysis and generates con- 
siderably lower price-marginal cost markups and implied Lerner index values for U.S. indus- 
tries. Even employing the values from Norrbin's analysis, however, AT&T's Lerner index 
values are in the middle of the pack for nonregulated industries in the United States. 
32 See Bresnahan, supra note 4, at 1051, table 17.1. 
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conclusion that, relative to other firms in the U.S. economy, AT&T pos- 
sesses very little market power. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS 
At the time of the divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T, considerable de- 
bate emerged concerning the long-run viability of competition in the long- 
distance telecommunications industry. In the period since divestiture, that 
debate has shifted to a consideration of the intensity of competition faced 
by the former monopoly supplier of long-distance service. To date, how- 
ever, the arguments presented have proceeded primarily on a priori theoreti- 
cal grounds pertaining to conditions of natural monopoly and largely ad hoc 
analyses of the emerging structural characteristics of the industry. While ev- 
idence of this nature is valuable in attempting to resolve this important pub- 
lic policy issue, it is important to attempt to corroborate such information 
with empirical studies as the requisite data become available. In this spirit, 
we have employed the DF/CF model to estimate both fringe supply and 
market demand elasticities in the interstate long-distance telecommunica- 
tions market. We have employed the resulting elasticity estimates along 
with extant information on AT&T's market share to calculate empirical es- 
timates of AT&T's market power. 
As with any empirical analysis, our results should be interpreted in the 
light of several caveats. First, our data series is relatively short, with only 
a 10-year window of observations. Ironically, given the empirical propen- 
sity of dominant firms to decline, the benefits of a longer time series may 
ultimately be offset by a declining applicability of the underlying DF/CF 
model to this industry. Thus, the window of opportunity for modeling this 
industry with the DF/CF model may be waning as the industry structure 
evolves. 
Second, as with other industries that have experienced the transition from 
regulated monopoly to competition, new pricing structures are emerging in 
the long-distance industry that limit the relevance of "list" prices. A no- 
ticeable deviation of average revenue per minute (that is, the actual transac- 
tions price) of long-distance service sold and the basic tariffed price began 
to emerge at the end of our sample period with the introduction of a variety 
of discount pricing plans by long-distance suppliers. To the extent that com- 
petition has increasingly driven transactions prices below the basic tariffed 
prices used in this study, our results regarding the competitive discipline 
imposed by the various competitors to the "dominant" firm are strength- 
ened, and our empirical conclusions are seen to be quite conservative. 
Third, while the theoretical construct is ideally designed to model the 
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market power held by AT&T for the set of long-distance services provided, 
the empirical model and data are limited to basic tariffed rates that apply 
to residential and small business consumers. Other services (for example, 
WATS) designed for use by high-volume consumers and discount programs 
available to residential customers are excluded from the empirical analysis. 
It is generally conceded that competition for these high-end services is keen 
and that no carrier has significant market power over these services.33 To 
the extent, then, that our empirical model is focused on the low-volume end 
of the market, our estimates of the Lerner index will, again, tend to err on 
the high side. 
Yet another caveat stems from the presence of regulation in the long- 
distance market. Specifically, our estimation of the Lerner index is predi- 
cated on the ability of the dominant firm to be able to equate marginal cost 
and the marginal revenue associated with the residual demand curve. To the 
extent that regulation may be binding, the profit-maximizing price of the 
dominant firm will be higher than observed prices and the corresponding 
estimate of the Lerner index is too low. Given, however, the previous em- 
pirical research demonstrating that relaxing regulatory controls in this mar- 
ket leads to lower prices, any distortions to our Lerner value estimates, if 
any, are likely to be minimal.34 
With these caveats noted, we conclude by suggesting that the approach 
adopted here of simultaneous estimation of fringe firm supply and market 
demand elasticities, when combined with marketplace data on market 
shares, offers a new and potentially useful tool for market power evalua- 
tions when more conventional residual demand estimation methods are un- 
available. 
33 For a discussion, see Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order, CC Docket 
93-197 (1995). 
34 See Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The Impact of Alternative Forms of State 
Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates, 20 RAND J. Econ. 
437, 453 (1989); and Robert Kaestner & Brenda Kahn, The Effects of Regulation and Com- 
petition on the Price of AT&T Intrastate Telephones Service, 2 J. Regulatory Econ. 363, 377 
(1990). Neither of these papers controls for the possibility of endogeneity in the choice of 
regulatory regime and may, therefore, contain flawed inferences regarding the impact of regu- 
lation on prices. An independent and correctly specified test of whether, and the extent to 
which, regulation is binding is beyond the scope of the present article. As noted by Ward, 
supra note 2, however, prices for residential and small business services were at their cap 
for only a relatively small portion of the 1989-91 period. This observation tends to corrobo- 
rate these prior authors' finding that regulation was not binding during this period. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE Al 
VARIABLE NAMES AND DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Source 
QM Interstate switched access minutes of all long-distance car- b 
riers 
PL Real consumer price index for local telephone service a 
(1982 - 1984 = 100)* 
PHONE Number of households with telephone service, measured b 
in millions 
PHONESQ PHONE*PHONE 
QF Interstate switched-access minutes by carriers other than b 
AT&T 
PA Real price of total access charges per conversation min- a 
utet 
P Average daytime real price of AT&T's long distance a 
interstate telephone service for a 10-minute 200-mile 
callt 
EA Percentage of total industry lines converted to equal b 
access 
Y Real disposable per capita income? c 
Di Quarterly dummies, i = 2, 3, 4 
SOURCEs.-(a) Federal Communications Commission, Common Carrier Bureau, Industry Analysis Di- 
vision, Reference Book: Rates, Indexes, and Household Expenditure for Telephone Services (May 1993); 
(b) Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, 1991/1992 
ed. (released January 1993); (c) Economic Report of the President (1985-94). 
* PL is calculated by deflating the nominal consumer price index for local telephone service with the 
consumer price index for all goods and services. 
t PA includes originating carrier common line charges, terminating carrier common line charges, and 
traffic sensitive charges. Note also that PA is calculated by deflating nominal access charges with the 
implicit price deflator. 
T Real prices are calculated by deflating nominal prices with the implicit price deflator. 
? Real per capita income is calculated by dividing nominal per capita income with the implicit price 
deflator (1982 = 1). 
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